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Inc.,2 1 it was held that the sureties on a lease of motor vehicles
were discharged by the continuation of the lease on a month-tomonth basis after the initial period of one year had expired. The
prolongation of the lease was provided for by the contract itself
but on the basis of two similar cases involving immovables the
court counted this fact as unimportant. This jurisprudence is
consistent with Article 2690 of the Code and the basic principle
that a contract of suretyship is strictissimijuris. No reason appears for drawing a distinction between leases of immovables
and leases of movables.
In Frug6. v. Muffoletto, 22 the Supreme Court, answering a

question certified by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, held
that where a tenant makes repairs and improvements to the
leased premises in keeping with authority granted by the lease
but at his own expense, laborers and furnishers of materials do
not have a privilege on the structure under R.S. 9:4801-17, but
their sole privilege is against the leasehold rights of the lessee
under R.S. 9:4811. Support for this conclusion was found also
in Article 3249 of the Civil Code.
TORTS
David W. Robertson*
INTERVENING NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE CAUSE

It would perhaps not be too grotesque an oversimplification
of the theory of tort liability to state that when defendant has
been guilty of a breach of a duty owed plaintiff, and that breach
has in fact caused some harm to plaintiff, then defendant will
be liable for the resultant loss. This statement's consistency
with fact may be preserved in all cases-even the most exceptional - by manipulation within the meaning of the term duty.
Thus, cases where defendant has been guilty of wrongdoing
causing plaintiff harm which the law deems unredressable can
be handled by stating that defendant owed no duty to plaintiff.
More often, however, such situations will be handled by the
courts in terms of proximate causation. It will be stated that
while defendant has been a wrongdoer and plaintiff has suf2i. 136 So.2d 458 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
22. 137 So. 2d 333 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
*Instructor in Law, Louisiana State University.
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fered harm, the harm plaintiff is complaining of did not proximately result from the wrong done.
It is practically a truism that no consistency in definitions
of "proximate cause" can be found in the cases. This is one of
the reasons supporting a great deal of scholarly argument in
favor of explaining no-recovery tort situations in terms of duty
rather than proximate cause.'
The choice of approaches is frequently presented by cases in
which defendant has negligently created a dangerous condition
upon which a later negligent act of a third party operates to
cause harm to the plaintiff; e.g., defendant negligently leaves
his vehicle parked on the highway, and plaintiff, a guest passenger, is injured when his host-driver negligently collides with
defendant's vehicle. Recovery against the driver of the parked
vehicle in this situation will often be denied, the usual theory
being that the later negligence of the host-driver amounted to
an intervening cause, which rendered defendant's original negligence passive, and therefore a remote rather than a proximate
cause of the harm. A recent case of this type is Foreman v.
American Automobile Insurance Co.2

There, plaintiff was a

passenger in a truck that, because of faulty brakes, collided
with the rear of defendant's truck stopped on the highway. The
court said that "since Whitehead, with properly working, brakes,
had ample time within which to stop his truck before the collision occurred, we think any negligence which may be attributed
to Morgan for bringing his truck to a stop suddenly cannot be
construed as constituting a proximate or contributing cause of
the accident." s
The Foreman problem could with equal plausibility be handled without reference to the concept of proximate causation.
The underlying question-whether defendant ought to be liable
for plaintiff's harm--could be framed in terms of the scope of
defendant's duty. Specifically, the question would be whether
the rule of negligence law violated by defendant-a rule requiring reasonable care and precaution in stopping a vehicle on a
public highway-protects against the risk of collision with another vehicle with faulty brakes.
1. See GEEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); Comment, 16 LA.
L. REv. 391 (1956).
2. 137 So. 2d 728 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
% . ... . .
3 . I d . a t 732 .

1963)

PRIVATE LAW

283-

Several other recent cases presented the problem involved
in Foreman-whether defendant should be relieved of liability
by the later negligence of another. In Spiers v. Consolidated
Companies, Inc.,4 defendant, pursuant to a long-standing agreement, had partially blocked a railroad track in order to position
a truck for loading. Plaintiff, a railroad train conductor, was
injured when the train in which he was riding was forced to
come to a sudden stop in order to avoid colliding with the truck.
The court concluded, first of all, that the defendant truck company had been guilty of no negligence, adverting to the agreement and to the fact that no injuries had resulted from the
practice of parking trucks in that location for more than twenty
years. Then, in dictum, the court addressed itself to the proximate cause question, stating: "If we should, however, assume
that defendant was negligent, there would still remain in our
minds serious doubt whether such negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident; and we would probably conclude.., that
the railway was negligent and that its negligence was the proximate cause of the accident." 5 Justice Sanders, dissenting, felt
that the negligence of defendant had been clearly established.
Therefore, he felt that the proximate cause issue presented the
real problem in the case. On this question he stated:
"[T]he subject of responsible causation is obscured by a
smog'of empty phrases and verbal intricacies ....
It is difficult if not impossible to reconcile the decisions that have
dealt with it ....
In the instant case, the negligence of the
defendant was a substantial factor in producing the harm
to the plaintiff. The intervening negligence of the Railway
was not a superseding cause for the employees of the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that an emergency
stop of a train might occur. . . . The defendant cannot be
absolved from responsibility merely because the negligence
of the Railway contributed to the result."6
Justice Sanders made reference to Jackson v. Jones, 7 a
case frequently cited in support of the proposition that whether
an intervening cause relieves defendant of liability for his original negligence turns on whether or not the intervening cause
was foreseeable. In that case, defendant, a contractor, stacked
4.
5.
6.
7.

241 La. 1012, 132 So. 2d 879 (1961).
Id. at 1027, 133 So. 2d at 884.
Id. at 1028, 133 So. 2d at 885.
224 La. 403, 69 So. 2d 729 (1953).
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lumber on a schoolyard and a child was injured through being
pushed into a protruding nail by a schoolmate. Defendant argued that his original negligence in stacking the lumber on the
schoolyard was not a proximate cause of the harm, since the
push administered by a schoolmate of plaintiff amounted to an
intervening cause. The court rejected this argument, saying
that as this kind of occurrence was clearly foreseeable, defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the harm.
The case of Brechtel v. Lopez" involved an interesting situation in which the intervening-cause argument was made. Plaintiff was one of two policemen in a prowl car which wrecked
while chasing a speeder. Defendant, the speeder, contended that
his acts did not amount to a proximate cause of the harm to
plaintiff, since the fact that the patrol car's brakes malfunctioned just prior to the collision amounted to an intervening
cause. The court rejected this argument, stating:
"In our opinion, the proximate cause of the accident was
speed, the grossly excessive speed of young Lopez ....

The

effect of the speed continued down to the very moment of
the accident. .

. The most that can be said from the ap-

pellant's standpoint is that the grabbing of the brakes was
an intervening efficient cause which broke the chain of
causation from the original negligent acts of young Lopez.
However, the mere fact that other forces have intervened
does not absolve the defendants where the injury might reasonably have been foreseen. [Citing, inter alia, Jackson v.
Jones.]"

A situation closely analogous to that presented in the Foreman case was involved in Peats v. Martin.10 Plaintiff - who
the court determined was not contributorily negligent - drove
into the rear of a negligently-parked pulpwood truck. A split
second later a butane truck collided with plaintiff's vehicle.
Defendant, the owner of the pulpwood truck, contended that
two separate accidents were involved, and that plaintiff could
recover against him for only the injuries sustained when she
hit the pulpwood truck. The court stated that it was unimpressed with this argument, since it had not been shown that
the butane truck driver was negligent or that his negligence
8. 140 So. 2d 189 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
9. Id. at 193.
10. 133 So. 2d 920 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
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was a proximate cause of the accident." Furthermore, the court
said that even if it be admitted that the negligence of the butane
truck driver was an intervening cause, this would not relieve
the pulpwood truck owner of liability unless it superseded the
original negligence.
In Levert v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,' 2 plaintiff, a guest at

a dance, fell when she sat on what appeared to be a substantial
throne but was in fact a perilous platform consisting of a stool
and a satin material which concealed a five-foot drop to a concrete floor. Defendant argued that the hazard created by its
insured was not the proximate cause of the accident, but rather
that the fall of the stool was the responsible cause. The court
rejected this argument, concluding that the fall of plaintiff
from the platform was a reasonably foreseeable result of the
hazard created.
In the cases discussed, the courts' approach to the question
whether a later causally operative force superseded defendant's
original negligence appeared to be completely satisfactory in
terms of the results achieved and in terms of analysis. But
that the proximate cause approach on this question is potentially
productive of analytical confusion is seen in the recent case of
Jones v. Tidwell.'8 There, defendant's pick-up truck stopped
on the highway and signalled for a left turn. Plaintiff halted
his vehicle behind the truck and waited for a moment; then he
undertook to pass the stationary truck on the right shoulder,
in violation of a statute. While plaintiff was engaged in this
maneuver, defendant's truck suddenly swerved to the right into
plaintiff's automobile. The defendant contended that plaintiff's violation of the statute rendered her contributorily negligent. The court rejected this argument, stating that violation
of a statute does not constitute actionable or contributory negligence unless the violation is causally connected with the accident. The court stated that "no causal connection between
the attempt to pass upon the shoulder and the accident is disclosed.'

4

It appears fairly clear that the rule adverted to by

the court has no application to the question of proximate cause,
but means only that violation of a statute must have been a
11.
in the
not be
12.
13.
14.

The court
absence of
shown.
140 So. 2d
139 So. 2d
Id. at 59.

followed up this statement with the puzzling observation that
the butane truck driver as a party litigant, his negligence could
811 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
57 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
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cause-in-fact of the accident in order to come into play in the
litigation. Proper application of this rule is seen in Roberts v.'
London Guar. & Acc. Co.15 There, plaintiff was perhaps speeding when he collided with left-turning defendant. The court
held that any speed violation of which plaintiff may have been
guilty was not causally related to the accident, since under the
facts shown plaintiff would have been unable to avoid the
collision no matter how slowly he had been driving. It is difficult to argue that the plaintiff's violation in Jones v. Tidwell
was not causally related to the accident. Ordinarily an act will
be deemed a cause-in-fact of a result when that result would not
have occurred but for the act in question; it seems apparent that
absent the act of plaintiff in passing on the right, the collision
would not have occurred.
In all of the cases discussed, the question whether an intervening cause should relieve defendant of liability could have
been handled under the suggested duty approach rather than
in proximate cause terms. In Jones v. Tidwell the confusion
alluded to would perhaps have been avoided had the court
handled the problem involved by reference to this question:
Was the rule (statute) which plaintiff violated - a prohibition
to protect against the
against passing on the right -designed
risk of collision with a vehicle which signalled for a left turn,
then suddenly veered to the right? Under this approach, the
possibility of confusion with the cause-in-fact element is diminished, and the question of contributory negligence is thrown into
clearer focus.
The suggested duty approach was used in the perhaps revolutionary recent Supreme Court case of Dixie Drive It Yourself
System v. American Beverage Co.,' 6 discussed in an earlier issue
of this Review-" It is sufficient for present purposes to state
that defendant therein made the argument that his negligence
in parking his truck on the highway without warning flares,
in violation of a statute, was only the remote cause of the accident, since the negligence of the driver of the vehicle which
collided with the rear of the parked truck was an intervening
cause. Mr. Justice Sanders, for the court, in an opinion partially
forecast by his dissent in the Spiers case, stated that the question of intervening causation could best be handled in terms
15. 140 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
16. 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298 (1962).
17. Note, 23 LA. L. REv. 142 (1963).
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of duty. His opinion made clear that the issue of causation is
restricted to the question of causation in fact-whether, but
for the act of defendant, the accident would have occurred. With
this problem disposed of, the intervening negligence question
was put in terms of whether the statute violated was designed
to protect against the risk of collision with an inattentively
driven vehicle. The court properly concluded that it was so
designed, holding defendant liable.
Inquiry into the extent of the change in tort analysis wrought
by the Dixie Drive It case could be extensive. A brief examination of two questions will have to suffice for the present. First,
the rule violated by defendant in Dixie was a statute, rather
than a rule of general negligence law. Whether the Dixie approach will be followed in a case where defendant's wrong consisted in violating a general case-law negligence rule is open to
question. It is somewhat easier to put the proximate cause question in risk-rule terms in a case of a statutory violation, because
the transition to the question whether the statute was designed
with this particular risk in mind is an easy one. But there seems
no good reason for making any distinction. While it is true that
courts in cases of statutory violation often speak in terms of
legislative intent, it would seem fairly apparent that the real
question being determined - the proper protective ambit of the
rule - is something the legislature did not consider. Also, in the
case of traffic statutes it is generally true that the legislature
has merely acted to declare what was already the existing rule
of negligence law.
Further argument in favor of applying the Dixie approach
to cases in which no statutory violation is involved might well
be predicated upon analogous problems where statutes and common law negligence rules are treated alike. Recent cases involving cause-in-fact problems present a ready illustration. As
already noted, the cases of Roberts v. London Guar. & Acc. Co.
and Jones v. Tidwell involved the proper application of the rule
requiring that a statutory violation be causally operative before
being given effect in civil litigation. In both, the statutory violation was deemed not to be causally connected. A case of a
causally operative statutory violation was Excel Insurance Co.
v. Continental Casualty Co.,' 8 in which plaintiff's violation of a
speed limit was held to amount to contributory negligence upon
18. 141 So. 2d 408 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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a showing that he skidded twenty-four feet before hitting defendant's vehicle. If plaintiff had been within the speed limit, he
would have slid only eighteen feet and would not have collided
with defendant's automobile. Cases involving this same causein-fact problem, but where the rule breached is a general negligence rule rather than a statute, are also commonplace. In
Skehee v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,19 plaintiff was a
guest passenger in a car driven by her deaf husband. Defendant
contended that she was contributorily negligent in entrusting
her person to the care of a deaf driver, but the court concluded
that the husband's deafness was not causally related to the
accident, as the facts showed that even had he heard defendant's
horn at the time it was sounded, he could not have avoided the
20
accident.
A second question with regard to the potential ambit of the
Dixie case is whether the approach taken therein would be followed in a case where defendant's negligently-created hazard
is operated upon, not by a third party, but by a contributorily
negligent plaintiff. Suppose, for example, defendant's negligently-parked vehicle is struck by a vehicle negligently driven
by plaintiff. The question put in Dixie would be whether the
rule defendant has violated extends to protect against the risk
of collision by an inattentive plaintiff. Strictly logical reasoning
from the Dixie holding might well produce an affirmative answer to this question, on the theory that if inattentive drivers
generally are within the ambit of protection of the rule defendant has breached, then there is no apparent reason to exclude
inattentive plaintiffs.
19. 139 So. 2d 794 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
20. An interesting twist on this analogous cause-in-fact is seen in the case of
Perkins v. Texas & New Orleans R.R., 137 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962),
which involved the question whether a railroad train's violation of a speed law
amounted to negligence. The court concluded, in light of fact that plaintiff was
killed at a blind crossing, that the railroad was negligent in operating a train
at a speed of 37 m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. zone. A vigorous dissent by Judge Hood
pointed out that the train could not possibly have stopped even had it been going
the lawful speed, so that it could not be said that speed was the cause of the
accident. He- exposed the fallacy in arguing that had the train been slower, it
would not have arrived at the crossing till plaintiff had gotten across by pointing
out that it could with equal plausibility be argued that had the train been driven
much faster it would have already passed when plaintiff reached the crossing. It
it to be noted that this argument of Judge Hood is implicit in the holding in the
Roberts case that, because plaintiff could not have stopped in time to avoid defendant's left-turning maneuver even had he been driving at a lawful speed, his
violation was not causally operative. Note that the court in Roberts did not concern itself with the possible argument that had plaintiff been travelling more
slowly he would not have been at the fateful spot at the fateful time.
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. A recent case demonstrates that a negligent plaintiff may
sometimes recover, even under the proximate cause analysis. In
Colonial Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 21 one of defendant's trains killed seventeen and injured three of plaintiff's
cows. The court rejected defendant's contention that the contributory negligence of plaintiff's employees barred recovery,
stating: "It may be true that the plaintiff's employees were at
fault in failing to secure the gate ... ; however, this negligence
was the remote and not the proximate cause of the accident. The
legal or proximate cause thereof was the failure of defendant's
crew... *"22
The general effect which may be given the Dixie case may
be indicated by its impact on those of the above-discussed cases
which were decided after the Dixie opinion was rendered. In
the Foreman case, Judge Tate in dissent called the attention of
the majority to the Dixie decision, stating: "The sudden unsignalled stop in violation of a highway safety ordinance was
a substantial cause in fact and is considered a proximate cause
of the accident, even though the negligence of the following
driver may have contributed to the accident. ' 23 In the Levert
case, after stating that the risk of plaintiff's falling was foreseeable and therefore a proximate result of the hazard created,
the court also stated that "the injury received was one for the
prevention of which the duty existed not to create such a con24
cealed hazard to the patrons' safety," citing the Dixie case.
And in the case of Steagall v. Houston Fire and Casualty Insurance Co., 25 plaintiff was a guest passenger in a car which collided with the rear of a vehicle negligently left on the highway
by defendant. The trial court therein sustained an exception
of no cause of action, on the theory that the negligence of plaintiff's husband constituted an intervening cause which rendered
defendant's negligence passive rather than active, and therefore
a remote, rather than a proximate cause. The court of appeal
reversed this determination, stating: "As we understand the
Dixie Drive It decision of our Supreme Court, it holds that the
concept of passive negligence is not recognized in Louisiana
law to defeat the claim of an innocent tort victim. '26 And,
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

138
Id.
137
140
138
Id.

So. 2d 216
at 218.
So. 2d 728,
So. 2d 189
So. 2d 433
at 436.

(La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
734 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
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cussion, the court stated that the
general rule that foreseeability
whether an intervening cause will
27
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the ambit of the present disDixie case departs from the
is the test for determining
operate to relieve the defend-

ant of liability.

DAMAGES FOR MENTAL SUFFERING

The law with regard to recovery of damages for emotional
or mental distress has long been in a state of confusion. Traditionally, the common law refused recovery for such injuries
because they were considered remote and difficult of proof.
Gradual incursions into this general rule have left the law in a
28
cloudy state.
However, one rule which has been reasonably clear in Louisiana is that a plaintiff may not recover for mental pain and
suffering occasioned by injury or threat of injury to the person
of another. A sizeable line of cases, beginning with Black v.
The Carrollton R.R., 29 in which a father who witnessed his son
being mutilated by one of defendant's trains was denied re0
covery, has established this proposition.A
Now it appears that this rule is likewise subject to exception.
In Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co.,31 noted elsewhere
in this Review,32 plaintiffs' infant son allegedly became ill from
eating rat poison left in plaintiffs' home by defendant exterminator pursuant to a contract for periodic fumigation and antipest treatment of the home. Plaintiffs' suit sought recovery for
mental and physical suffering undergone by the child, for medical damages sustained on behalf of the child, and for mental
pain and suffering undergone by the parents as a result of this
experience. In the trial court a jury found against plaintiffs
27. Norton v. Argonaut Insurance Co., 144 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1962).
28. See PROSSER, TORTS §§ 11, 37 (1955) ; Note, 21 LA. L. REV. 858 (1961)
Comment, 15 LA. L. REV. 451 (1955) ; Note, 6 LA. L. REV. 475 (1945).
29. 10 La. Ann. 33 (1855).
30. Sperier v. Ott, 116 La. 1087, 41 So. 323 (1906) ; Brinkman v. St. Landry
Cotton Oil Co., 118 La. 835, 43 So. 458 (1907) ; Barrera v. Schuler, 5 La. App.
67 (Orl. Cir. 1926) ; Alston v. Cooley, 5 La. App. 623 (1st Cir. 1927) ; Sherwood
v. Ticheli, 120 So. 107 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1929) ; Seligman v. Holladay, 154 So.
481 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934) ; Grier v. Tri-State Transit Co., 30 F. Supp. 26
(D. La. 1940) ; Hughes v. Gill, 41 So. 2d 536 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949) ; Covey
v. Marquette Casualty Co., 84 So. 2d 217 (La. App. Orl Cir. 1956) ; Honeycutt
v. American General Ins. Co., 126 So. 2d 789 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).

31. 135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
32. Note, 23 LA. L. REV. 473 (1963).
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as to the damages sustained by the child. An exception of no
cause of action was sustained by the trial judge as to the causes
seeking recovery for the parents' mental damages. Only the
latter issue was presented on appeal.
The court of appeal reversed the trial court as to the cause
of action for mental suffering of the parents. After an exhaustive review of the jurisprudence, the court acknowledged the
rule that recovery may not be had for mental suffering growing
out of physical damages to the person of another. However, the
court pointed out that in a respectable group of cases damages
have been had for mental suffering unaccompanied by physical
damage. According to the court's reasoning, plaintiffs' cause
did not derive from physical injury to their son, but rather upon
a separate duty to them - the duty swiftly to divulge the contents of the poison it was feared that the infant had eaten. The
record in the case showed that defendant was not able to state
the contents of the poison used with explicitness or promptness
sufficient for proper treatment of the child. As a result of this
failure the parents spent three hours fearing the child would
die for lack of treatment, which could not be administered without some identification of the poison consumed. Thus it was
immaterial whether the child actually ate any poison or not;
plaintiffs could recover for breach of a separate duty owed to
them. Recognizing that a new rule of liability was being laid
down, the court was at pains to restrict the parties to whom
such a duty of divulgence is owed to the father and mother,
expressly enumerating several third parties, such as house
guests, who would not be within the ambit of the duty.
This case appears to the reviewer to be highly significant,
and bears further analysis. First, the law governing recovery
of damages for mental suffering unaccompanied by physical
injury lacks the clarity attributed to it by the court in the
Holland case. With one exception,88 which the court implied was
a sport, the cases cited by plaintiff and accepted by the court
in support of this proposition involved either breach of contract
or intentional and somewhat outrageous conduct on the part
of defendant.8 4 In none of these cases was recovery allowed for
negligently-inflicted mental suffering unaccompanied by physical injury.
33. Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1951).
34. Lafitte v. New Orleans City & L.R.R., 43 La. Ann. 34, 8 So. 701 (1890)
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For present purposes, discussion of the breach of contract
cases will be omitted. But the basis of any distinction between
negligently and intentionally-inflicted mental suffering- a distinction which the instant court did not acknowledge -bears
pondering. At the outset, a problem of definition presents itself.
When will conduct causing mental or emotional harm be counted
as intentional? In one sense, all conduct causing mental or any
other kind of distress is intentional - defendant always intends
to do something. However, in line with the generally accepted
definition of intention, it would probably be correct to state
that mental distress is intentionally inflicted when defendant
either actively desired to bring about that result or realized to
a virtual certainty that it would come about. Taking this definition on its face, and contrasting it with the generally understood
meaning of the concept of negligence, there would perhaps seem
no apparent reason for drawing a distinction between mental
distress which is negligently inflicted and like harm caused intentionally. However, in the great majority of the cases involving intentional conduct there is an element of outrageousness involved, at least to the extent of crass disregard of ordinary human feelings. This was true of the cases relied upon by
the instant court in support of the proposition that recovery
may be had for mental damage unaccompanied by physical injury. 35 This is the position which has been taken by the Restatement of Torts.3 6 The element of outrage is important for two
reasons -one,
because it places a moral onus upon defendant
which militates toward liability; two, because the element of
outrage goes far toward guaranteeing the genuineness of the injury claimed.
But there is a deeper issue in the case. The basis of the
holding would appear to be that plaintiffs are not relying upon
the breach of duty to their son, or upon the alleged injury
to their son. On the contrary, they are parties to whom a duty
(intentional;

plaintiff falsely accused of passing a counterfeit bill); Lewis v.

Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903) (breach of contract for furnishing wedding dress) ; Graham v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91
(1930) (defendant failed to deliver death telegram; treated as quasi-contract,
because plaintiff not sender, but addressee) ; Haile v. New Orleans Ry. & Light

Co., 135 La. 229, 65 So. 225 (1914)

(intentional; plaintiff told that a person as

fat as she should sit in rear of bus) ; Quina v. Roberts, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1944) (intentional; debt letter to plaintiff's employer).
35. Ibid. The conduct in Quina v. Roberts may not merit the descriptive "outrageous."
36. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 46 (1948 Supp.) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS
146 (1957).
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has been owed and breached, with the result that they have
undergone emotional damage- just as were the plaintiffs in
the cases cited. 37 One problem with this approach has already
been mentioned- the traditional significance accorded to the
difference in the type of conduct involved. More basically, the
statement that a separate duty is owed in one sense assumes
the matter to be decided. If there is any validity to traditional
tort doctrine, recovery will lie whenever a duty has been owed
to plaintiff, that duty has been breached, and damage to plaintiff has been proximately caused thereby. The statement that
a duty exists is often, as would appear to be true in the instant
case, merely another way of saying that liability will be imposed. There is nothing wrong with saying that defendant owed
plaintiffs a duty here to be prompt and accurate in divulging
information about the ingredients in the poisons used. But it
ought to be emphasized that finding a separate duty is not a
reason for liability; it is but another way of stating that liability
will ensue. If the existence of a separate duty is to be counted
as a reason for imposing liability, then why not impose a duty
upon the tortfeasor in cases like Black v. The Carrollton R.R.?
Would it not be entirely plausible to state that the defendant
in such a case owed a duty of due care to the injured child, based
upon the reasonable foreseeability of injury to persons from
negligent operation of the railway, and an entirely separate
duty of due care to plaintiff-father, based upon the reasonable
foreseeability of mental injury to parents who witness their
children injured by a negligently-operated railway? It is true
that in the instant case the physical actions which would be
necessary in order for defendants to discharge the duty to the
parents are different from those which would be involved in
discharging the duty to the child. As to the parents, defendants
are required to know and promptly divulge the ingredients of
the poisons used; as to the child, to use due care in administering
the poison. But is there any reason why this difference should
be of significance?
Similar difficulties present themselves when the problem
is put in terms of proximate causation. 3 This approach would
37. See note 34, supra.
38. An approach which the instant court seems to have repudiated (quoting
from an annotation at 18 A.L.R.2d 240 (1951), as follows: "'As to the solving
of the question on legal principle, the better-considered opinions declare that it is
not a question of proximate cause but one of legal duty.'" 135 So. 145, 152),
yet followed. (Id. at 157.)
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in the Carrollton Railroad case involve assuming the existence
of a duty of due care, and in asking the question whether the
injuries the father sustained were so remote from the act of
negligence or so unforeseeable as not to be the proximate result thereof. In the instant case, the same approach would
involve assuming the existence of a duty of due care in handling
and usage of poisons, which would include reasonable knowledge
of their ingredients, and in asking the question whether the
injury sustained by the parents as the result of a failure to
discharge that duty properly was without the realm of foreseeability to such an extent as not to be the proximate result
of the breach. Here, again, the same anomaly - is the one less
foreseeable or more remote than the other?
Despite these difficulties of rationale, the policy reason for
extending liability in the Holland case is easily discovered. The
primary reasons underlying holdings like that in the Carrollton
Railroad case are fear on the part of the courts that proof of
genuineness of the harm will be troublesome and that to allow
recovery in such cases would be unduly provocative of litigation.
The court was careful to point out that a duty restricted to
the father and mother would hardly be subject to these criticisms. Further, the fact that the parties involved in the Holland
case were in a position of reliance upon defendant's implied
warranty of due care is an added safeguard against the danger
of overly extending the rule of the case.
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
In origin the phrase res ipsa loquitur was descriptive of a
particular kind of case in which a finding of negligence was
based upon circumstantial evidence. In that narrow class of
cases the thing spoke for itself because the particular bit of
data from which the fact of negligence was inferred was the
occurrence of harm itself. However, in the way of easy phrases,
the descriptive developed into a doctrine, with concomitant
qualifications and requirements. One frequently-stated requisite
to the application of the doctrine is that defendant must be in
better position to explain the occurrence than plaintiff. This
restriction has been criticized as being based upon an erroneous
view of the nature of a res ipsa case, and any formalistic resort
to it has been deplored because it is not a restriction which
operates as to inferential proof generally, and because of the
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inference is
unwisdom of a rule whereby "the strength of an
39
...

measured in terms of how badly it is needed.

Despite such criticism, the recent Louisiana jurisprudence
indicates that the superiority of defendents' understanding of
the accident is an often-stated, if less often operative, part of
the doctrine. In at least five recent cases, various statements

of the requirement that defendant must be in better position to
explain the occurrence than plaintiff were made. In three of

these cases, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was nevertheless applied.4 0 In the remaining two, where res ipsa loquitur was held

unavailable to plaintiff, it is probable that the restriction in
a variety
question had less effect than the circumstance that
41
of equally compelling inferences were permissible.

A second and even less supportable restriction that has some-

times hampered use of the res ipsa doctrine is the notion that
plaintiff cannot rely upon the inference presented by the fact
of the accident if he has alleged or attempted to prove specific

acts of negligence. The existence of this idea is probably explained by an unfounded feeling that a res ipsa loquitur case is
something mysterious and different from others in which inference from circumstantial evidence is crucial, and therefore
ought to be carefully hedged in. The restriction has no particular logical merit, and it is certainly a weighty argument
that plaintiff "should not be denied the benefit of any natural
inference which may arise from the occurrence of the accident
merely because he does not care to rest his chances upon that
inference alone. '42 In TranscontinentalInsurance Co. v. Gilette
Oil Co., 43 defendant argued against applying the doctrine be39. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of the
Louisiana Cases, 4 LA. L. REV. 70, 92 (1941).
40. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Herrin Transportation
Co., 136 So.2d 272 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) (Where plaintiff's automobile struck
an unidentified metal object as he was meeting one of defendant's trucks, liability
was predicated upon the inference that the object came from the truck. As a
matter of fact, the object was never found nor identified, and defendant was
actually as unable to explain as was plaintiff.) ; Bonura v. Barq's Beverages of
Baton Rouge, 135 So. 2d 338 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) (exploding bottle of root
beer) ; Maryland Casualty Company v. Rittiner, 133 So. 2d 172 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1961) (builders caused flash asphalt fire; liability predicated upon Article
667, and upon Article 2315 buttressed by res ipsa loquitur).
41. Kamra Lumber Co. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 132 So. 2d 688 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1961) ; Jefferson Davis Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Mike Hooks,
Inc., 134 So. 2d 326 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
Discussion of the
42. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference -A
Louisiana Cases, 4 LA. L. REv. 70, 92 (1941).
43. 139 So. 2d 541 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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cause plaintiff had attempted to prove the cause of the accident
and particular negligent acts of defendant. The court did not
meet that argument, stating that "whether or not the doctrine
' 44 because defendant would not be
is applicable is immaterial,"
45
liable in either event.
INVITEES AND LICENSEES

Traditional tort theory places persons who enter the land
or premises of another in three categories - invitees, licensees,
and trespassers. With respect to dangerous conditions on the
land, the duty owed an invitee, a person who enters with the
express or implied permission of the occupier under circumstances in which the invitation carries an implied representation
of the safety of the premises, is ordinarily to use reasonable
care to learn of such conditions and warn the invitee of the
danger or to make the premises safe. A licensee is a person
who comes upon the premises with the express or implied permission of the occupier for a purpose wholly his own. To him,
the occupier's duty is generally to warn of any dangerous conditions which are actually known. With some exceptions, the only
duty owed a trespasser is to warn him of known conditions
once his presence is discovered.
The use of these classifications in determining the nature of
an occupier's duty to persons on his premises has been subjected
to some criticism as an arbitrary and artificial method of dealing with the problem. Despite such criticism, the distinctions
persist. It is, however, notable that in at least three recent court
44. Id. at 543.
45. Several other recent cases involved res ipsa loquitur problems worthy of
passing mention. In Wright v. Superior Oil Co., 138 So. 2d 688 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962), plaintiff's water well was damaged by a seismographic explosion caused
by defendant. Plaintiff recovered, but no mention of res ipsa loquitur was made
in the case, arguably out of regard for the requirement that defendant be in
better position to explain. In Montet v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 135 So. 2d 805 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1961), defendants had been engaged in pumping out their reserve
pit, discharging red drilling mud and salt, and plaintiff's farmlands became salty
and covered with a red substance. The court of appeal affirmed a trial court
conclusion that plaintiff had failed to prove that his damage was caused by the
defendant. The res ipsa doctrine was not discussed, but would clearly seem to
have been available. It is often invoked in cases where the missing element is
not breach of duty, but, as here, cause-in-fact. In Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v.
Grotts, 136 So. 2d 836 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), plaintiff's car was destroyed
by fire while in defendant's charge for the purpose of welding a trailer hitch on
the rear bumper. The court stated that defendant's admission that his employee
was using a welding torch near the gasoline tank of the car was "prima facie
proof under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, since Grotts' agent was using a dangerous instrumentality . . .close to a tank full of gasoline." Id. at 837-38.
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of appeal cases, situations which ordinarily evoke reference to
the categories were handled without expressly classifying the
47
injured parties. 46 One of the three, Jumonville v. Calogne,
involved a plaintiff whose status has caused some difficulty.a social guest. Plaintiff in that case fell down the basement
stairs in defendant's home while being shown to the bathroom
by her hostess. The court recognized a duty on the part of the
homeowner to warn plaintiff of existing dangers, but held that
her fall was due to her own contributory negligence. Under the
circumstances of the case, the duty owed plaintiff would have
been the same whether she be classified as invitee or licensee,
defendant homeowner being presumed to have knowledge of
the existence of a stairway in his home- which probably accounts for the court's unconcern with the invitee-licensee distinction.
By way of contrast, plaintiffs were expressly classified in at
least four recent cases. Dedon v. Grant Chemical Co. 48 involved
the question whether plaintiff, who went into defendant's warehouse to inquire about a bill of lading but who deviated from
his original purpose to get a drink of water, continued to occupy
his original invitee status at the time his injury was sustained when he drank from a jar containing a harmful chemical, be-:
lieving it to be water. The court of appeal held that plaintiff
continued to be an invitee, distinguishing cases in which invitees
who remained on the premises after completion of their business mission were held to have been demoted to licensees when
the business mission ceased; but pointed out that even if plaintiff herein were considered a licensee he would still recover,
since defendants owed him a duty to warn of dangers of which
they were aware.
In Levert v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 49 plaintiff, a guest at
a dance given by a civic organization, was classified as an in46. Jumonville v. Calogne, 141 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; Baker
v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 136 So. 2d 828 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961),
in which plaintiff, a business guest who slipped on a wet service station driveWay, was impliedly treated as an invitee but was denied recovery; LeJeune v.'
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 136 So. 2d 157 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961), in
which plaintiff who tripped over a chair in the aisle of a department store was
denied recovery because there was no showing that the chair was placed in that
position by an employee of defendant or that it had been there long enough to
impose a duty of knowledge and removal.
47. 141 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
48. 136 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
49: 140 So. 2d 811 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), also discussed in text acompanying notes 12, 24, supra.
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vitee. In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Illinois Central R.R., 50
plaintiffs engaged in unloading some heavy machinery by crane
near defendant's railroad track were classified as invitees, and
liability was predicated upon defendant's failure correctly to
predict the arrival time of a train which damaged plaintiffs'
crane. The court quoted with approval from the trial court's
judgment, in which the trial judge referred to a 1957 decision 5i
that advocated abolishing the distinction between invitee and
licensee and recognized classification of social guests as a major
difficulty. The trial court in the instant case stated that "until
the distinction . . . is directly adjudged and abolished, we will
' 2
apply the existing invitee rule. ,
Finally, in Greenlee v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,53 plaintiff,
the purchaser of a hot water heater from defendant, sustained
back injuries while assisting an employee of defendant in the
unloading operations at plaintiff's home. The court of appeal,
while stating that plaintiff occupied the status of an invitee as
to defendant, held that it was not negligence for defendant to
send only one employee to deliver the heater. Ordinarily, of
course, the invitee classification applies to a plaintiff who has
gone upon land occupied by another. However, support for the
court's classification of plaintiff in the Greenlee case may be
found in Campbell v. All State Insurance Co., 54 in which the
court wrestled with a similar problem and expressly held that
the fact that defendant did not own the premises upon which
the injury occurred was immaterial in light of the fact that
defendant had requested plaintiff to assist him. Difficulties of
this kind highlight the artificial nature of the invitee-licensee
distinction.
LATENT BRAKE DEFECT AS A DEFENSE
The automobile driver who collides with another vehicle
while outside his proper lane of traffic is ordinarily held to a
strict burden of exculpation. This burden operated devastatingly
against defendant in at least two recent cases. 55 In one of them,
50. 140 So. 2d 811 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
51. Alexander v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Co., 98 So. 2d
730 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957), noted at 19 LA. L. REv. 906 (1959).
52. 140 So. 2d 811, 926 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
53. 138 So. d 866 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
54. 112 So. 2d 143 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949).
55. Breaux v. Valin, 138 So. 2d 405 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962); Service Fire
Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 138 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
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Breaux v. Valin, 56 defendant attempted to discharge her burden
by showingthat when she touched her brake pedal out of regard
for a child running toward the highway, the brakes on her
pick-up truck malfunctioned, causing the truck to veer to the
left into plaintiff's lane of traffic. The court adverted to "Louisiana jurisprudence holding that the unsupported testimony of
the driver that the brakes suddenly failed due to a latent defect
is not sufficient evidence to prove that the accident was unavoidable for such reason. '57 Since defendant did not produce
the testimony of a mechanic or other evidence of the existence
of a defect in her brakes, this line of defense was deemed unworthy.
It is significant that the court of appeal decision was a
reversal of the trial court's judgment in this case. It is evident
that the trial court had accepted defendant's testimony as to
the brake failure. Ordinarily, trial court findings of fact, particularly when based squarely upon testimony of in-court witnesses, are entitled to great weight on appeal; it is generally
stated that such findings will not be overturned unless found
manifestly erroneous. 58 The court in Breaux made no mention
of the manifest error rule, presumably on the theory that the
rule of non-acceptance of uncorroborated exculpatory testimony
as to brake failure amounts to a rule of law. Therefore, in
theory the court of appeal was not engaged in overturning a
trial court finding of fact but in correcting a mistake of law.
In support of the requirement of additional evidence, the
court cited two cases. In Hassell v. Colletti,59 when defendant's tractor-trailer rig collided with the rear of plaintiff's
stationary automobile, he was held liable despite his plea
that his brakes suddenly failed. In the opinion of this reviewer, the language used by the court does not demonstrate
any intention to establish an unbending rule of law that defendant will never be believed when he alleges that his brakes
failed.
It is notable that the finding of the trial court was
56. Breaux v. Valin, 138 So. 2d 405 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
57. Id. at 408.
58. See Tate, 'Manifest Error'-FurtherObservations on Appellate Review
of Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases, 22 LA. L. REv. 605 (1962) ; Hardy, The Manifest Error Rule, 21 LA. L. REV. 749 (1961); Comment, 21 LA. L. REV. 402
(1961).
59. 12 So. 2d 31 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1943).
60. "The main witness . . . was . . . the driver of the truck and trailer.
The sum and substance of his testimony is that the brakes on the trailer had
been relined approximately a month and a half before the accident; that the
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accepted in Hassell; no conflict with the manifest error rule was
presented. Furthermore, the requirement of corroborating testimony did not appear to be crucial to the outcome, as it was in
Breaux, since in Hassell the court stated that it was evident that
the truck owner failed to have the brake system regularly inspected, and further that a statute requiring a second operative
set of brakes had been violated. 61
In the second case cited in Breaux, Trascher v. Eagle Indemnity Co.,6

2

the court did refer to the requirement of some cor-

roboration of the existence of defective brakes as a "rule of
law,"63 citing the Hassell case. In Trascher, as in Hassell, the
accident occurred when defendant drove into the rear of plaintiff's stopped automobile. And here again, the trial court's
finding was affirmed.
In Foreman v. American Automobile, Insurance Co.,64 Judge

Tate, who was the author of the Breaux opinion, had earlier
adverted to the requirement of corroborative testimony in the
case of allegedly exculpatory brake failure, this time in dissent.
In that case, plaintiff was a passenger in one of the trucks
owned by defendant, his employer. The truck in which plaintiff
was riding collided with the rear of another of defendant's
trucks which was stopped in the highway. The majority of the
court affirmed the trial court's decision for plaintiff based upon
a finding that the accident occurred because the brakes of the
truck in which plaintiff was riding were faulty, rather than
because of any negligence on the part of the driver of the stationary truck. The conclusion that the brakes of the moving
brakes were checked every other week; that, on the day of the accident and prior
thereto, they had been in perfect working condition and that, when he was descending the west ramp of the Huey P. Long bridge, they suddenly failed to respond
to his timely application. If this testimony should be deemed sufficient to exonerate the defendants, it would indeed be an easy matter for any defendant in an
accident of this kind to avoid the consequences of his neglect. While the doctrine
of latent defects in automobiles has been recognized as a valid defense by the
courts in actions of this kind, it is manifest that the proof submitted by the
alleged tort-feasor must be of a most convincing nature. In fact, we think that
the evidence should be such as to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis in
respect to the cause of the accident except that it resulted solely from the alleged
defect." Id. at 32.
61. See Comment, 5 LA. L. REv. 432, 461 (1943) : "In [the Hassell] case where
defendant's truck ran into plaintiff's parked car, a defense based on latent defects
in the brakes was rejected because defendant did not attempt to prove the nature
of the defect or that if it existed it could not have been discovered and remedied
by proper inspection."
62. 48 So. 2d 695 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1950).
63i Id. at 698.
64. 137 So. 2d 728 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), discussed in text accompanying
note 2,supra.
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truck were faulty was based upon testimony of its driver. Judge
Tate dissented from refusal to grant a rehearing because "the
courts do not allow the rather common exculpatory excuse advanced by drivers that an unanticipated brake failure was the
cause of an accident.., when such excuse is supported only by
865
the uncorroborated testimony of the driver.
Aside from Judge Tate's two recent statements of this rule,
and the two cases cited by him in support thereof, no cases have
been discovered in which it has received application. In Marks
6 6
v. Highway Insurance Underwriters,
one defendant sought to
exonerate himself by claiming sudden brake failure. The court
rejected this defense without reference to any special requirement of corroborative evidence, simply stating that "the weight
6' 7
of the evidence is against defendants on this point.
Where the alleged exculpatory latent defect is of a type other
than brake failure, there is indication in the jurisprudence that
the courts are indisposed to resort to any such rule. In Lasseigne
v. Kent,6 8 defendant's automobile swerved into the rear of plaintiff's vehicle while defendant was attempting to overtake and
pass plaintiff. Defendant contended that the swerving of his
vehicle was caused by the sudden puncture of a tire, and that
the accident was therefore unavoidable. The court stated:
"The . . . defense . . . that the swerving of the automobile
was caused by a suddenly acquired puncture, depends entirely upon the determination of a question-of-fact ....
There
are circumstances which are corroborative of the testimony
given by each set of witnesses, and had the record been
presented to us without guiding light furnished by the
opinion of our brother below, who saw and heard the witnesses, we would find it difficult indeed to arrive at the
conclusion that the testimony for either side substantially
preponderates. But in such case the rule is applicable that
a finding of fact made by a trial court will not be reversed,
unless manifestly erroneous, and we are unable to say that
65. Id. at 734. The Hassell and Trascher cases were cited.
66. 51 So. 2d 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951).
67.Id. at 823. The court of appeal disagreed with the trial court as to the
existence of the defect. The trial court gave judgment against defendant, stating
that the accident was the result of "either the bad condition of the brakes . . .
or bad driving." Quoted id. at 820. The court of appeal thought no brake defect
had been established, but upheld the trial court's judgment on the basis of the
"bad driving."
68. 142 So. 867 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932).
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the finding in favor of plaintiff on this question of fact was
manifestly wrong." 69 (Emphasis added.)
Likewise, there seems no disposition on the part of the courts
to resort to any formal requirement of corroborative evidence
in cases where the existence of brake failure is relied upon as
evidence of negligence, rather than in exculpation.7"
It is highly noteworthy that in both cases relied upon by the
Breaux court in support of the rule in question, the trial court's
finding of fact on the point of brake failure was affirmed;
therefore, no conflict with the habitual deference accorded trial
court findings of fact was presented. Furthermore, both of those
cases involved factual situations in which defendant's automobile collided with the rear of plaintiff's stationary vehicle. It
would seem that if there is any proper scope of application of
a rule of law requiring defendant to produce some external evidence when he is relying upon a latent brake defect in defense,
it should be restricted to cases of this kind- i.e., where defendant's inability to stop caused the accident. Indeed, the court in
Breaux appeared to acknowledge this situation as the typical
one, stating that "an honest witness may indeed truthfully feel
that the failure of his brakes to react as he desperately desired
them to during the split-seconds of sudden accident was the
cause of the accident instead of his own inattention or lack of
control.""
DRIVER OF AUTOMOBILE AS AGENT OF OWNER

The advent of the teen-age driver provoked some machinations in the law of the parent-child relationship in most common
law states. Policy demanded that some legal means of imposing
liability upon the parent of a judgment-proof negligent teenager be devised. One of the methods commonly used was to seize
upon any shred of an element of agency or employment between
the parent and the child-driver, and thus to determine liability
under the rules applicable to master and servant.
69. Id. at 868.
70. See Davis v. New York Underwriters Insurance Co., 141 So. 2d 673 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1962) ; Burton v. Southwsetern Gas & Electric Co., 107 So. 2d 62.
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1958) ; Woodward v. Tillman, 82 So. 2d 121 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1955) ; Pine v. Edmonds, 73 So. 2d 318 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954) ; Dejean v.,
Hattier, 65 So. 2d 623 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953); Allen v. Allbritton, 172 So.
198 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937).
71. 138 So. 2d at 408.
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. Louisiana was able to stand smugly by and witness this
struggle, since our long-standing rule of vicarious liability of
parents obviated the problem.72 However, something similar
has apparently been taking place in our recent jurisprudence
with regard to the responsibility of an owner-passenger for
negligent harm caused by the automobile while in the control
of another. Obviously, the existence of an actual agency or
employment relationship will impose liability under familiar
agency principles. Service Fire Insurance Co. v. Johnsonv
illustrates the more traditional agency relationship between
owner-passenger and driver. There, defendant-owner, intoxicated, was being driven by a fifteen-year-old boy, whose negligence the court experienced no difficulty in imputing to defendant. On the other hand, Mayberry v. McDuffie 4 involved
factual circumstances in which the agency relationship was
more nebulous. There, the owner of the offending vehicle had
lent it to a minister for the purpose of making some hospital
visits. Her testimony that she accompanied him solely for the
pleasure of the ride was not accepted by the court. While recognizing that "the presumptions flowing from the ownership and
service of a motor vehicle ... are rebuttable, ' 75 the court nevertheless felt that "defendant relied solely upon her own testimony, and its unsatisfactory and unconvincing character is
76
insufficient."
By way of contrast, in Washington Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Bacon,77 plaintiff's automobile was being driven by
her son, apparently a major. The court stated that since the son
was "using his mother's automobile to serve his own interests
and was not engaged upon a mission for her either as agent
or employee, his [contributory] negligence, if any, cannot be
imputed to her."78 Apparently, however, if plaintiff had been
present in the automobile at the time of the accident, the presumption described in Mayberry v. McDuffie would have operated against her.
VIOLATION OF ZONING ORDINANCE AS NUISANCE PER SE
Louisiana is in accord with the majority of American states
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2318 (1870).
138 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
135 So. 2d 366 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
Id. at 367.
Ibid.
138 So. 2d 667 (La.. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
Id. at 669.
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in consistently holding that the violation of a zoning ordinance
amounts to a nuisance per se. The theory underlying this rule
is often stated to be that such defiance of municipal government
must be considered a nuisance at law. 79 Recent doubt was cast
upon the universality of this rule in Hutson v. Continental Oil
Co.,80 in which defendant service station owner was in violation
of ordinances of the City of Shreveport in two relatively minor
particulars. Rejecting plaintiff's contention that the mere fact
of defendant's violation of the ordinances was sufficient to
characterize the activity in question as a nuisance per se, the
court stated: "Absent the establishment of any element of damage, we find no authority by which individuals are vested with
the right to an injunction for the purpose of preventing violations of a zoning ordinance." 81
The Hutson decision casts doubt on the theory that it is
the fact of defiance of governmental authority, rather than
the character of the particular activity, which amounts to a
nuisance. In a later case in the same circuit, the court referred
to the Hutson case, stating that "it is made abundantly clear
in the Hutson decision that the reason plaintiffs' demands were
rejected was because of the minor nature of the violations involved."

82

SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITY-

"SIDEWALK"

EXCEPTION

A well-recognized exception to the rule of non-liability of a
municipality for harm caused in the performance of a governmental function allows recovery for personal injuries resulting
from the city's failure to keep streets and sidewalks in reasonable and safe condition for their intended use. The proper extent of this sidewalk exception was at issue in Cook v. Shreveport.83 Plaintiff had tripped over a surveyor's stake, which
city employees had driven into the ground within the fenced
area of her yard. The court, apparently influenced by the fact
that the stake was placed within a clearly-defined footpath leading from plaintiff's gate to her front door, held that the sidewalk exception would operate to plaintiff's benefit under these
facts. A dissenting judge pointed out that the area in question
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See 166 A.L.R. 659, 661 (1947).
136 So. 2d 714 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
Id. at 119.
Wright v. DeFatta, 142 So. 2d 489, 494 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
;;: .. •
134 So. 2d 582 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
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Was not open to the public, but clearly well away from the area
which would ordinarily be expected to accommodate users of
streets and sidewalks. In his view, the majority position represented an unreasonable extension of the exception. It is noteworthy that the Cook case reaches a result consonant with an
apparent national trend toward diminution of the sovereign immunity doctrine.
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

It is hornbook law that one who has voluntarily disabled
himself by reason of intoxication is held to the same degree of
care and prudence in the interest of his own safety as is required of a sober person. Further, evidence of intoxication is
admissible as indicative of contributory negligence, and may be
conclusive if it is shown that the intoxication was of such degree
as to cause loss of control of the muscles and senses. 84 Two recent cases properly applied the general rule that intoxication
offers no comfort to the contributorily negligent plaintiff.8 5 But
in Johnson v. New Orleans Public Service Inc.,86 which turned
upon the duty owed by a public carrier to an intoxicated passenger, the court of appeal stated, in its summary of the trial
court's findings in that case: "The court was of the opinion
that, as a result of his intoxication, Johnson was incapable of
being contributorily negligent. 817 The opinion of the court of
appeal makes no further reference to this portion of the trial
court's holding, and the judgment for plaintiff was reversed, the
court finding that no breach of the carrier's duty had been
shown. In view of the overwhelming weight of authority against
the implication that it is possible to be too drunk to be chargeable with contributory negligence, it seems apparent that the
court of appeal did not intend that the trial court's statement
to this effect be tacitly confirmed. On the contrary, the court's
silence is explained by the absence of any necessity of dealing
84. See 38 AM. JuR. 883, 203 (1941)..
85. Robinson v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 135 So. 2d 607 (1a. App. 1st Cir.
1961),'.holding that the dismissal of a father's suit.for damages sustained by his
seventeen-year-old son while drunk on wine sold to him by defendant in viola-

tion of statute was:proper when son's contributory negligence was obvious from
plaintiff's petition; Manuel v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 140 So. 2d 702
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), holding that defendant sheriff was not negligent in
closing the jail door on plaintiff's little finger, and stating in dictum that even
could defendant be shown to have been negligent, intoxicated plaintiff's contributory negligence, would bar his recovery'.

86. 139 So.2d 7 (La. App. 4th Cir..1962).
87. Id. at 8.
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with the question of contributory negligence, since primary
negligence was found to be lacking. However, in light of the
completely erroneous nature of the trial court statement, perhaps an express rejection of it by the court of appeal would have
been warranted.
DEFAMATION -

QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE

88
Prior to the 19,05 case of Lescale v. Joseph Schwartz Co.,
the scope of the privilege against defamation actions extended
by Louisiana law to statements of parties and attorneys in judicial proceedings was ill-defined. That case, however, settled the
proposition that the common law rule of absolute privilege does
not apply in Louisiana. On the contrary, statements by attorneys or parties litigant in judicial proceedings 9 will be privileged only if relevant, made without malice, and with "probable
cause. '"
Similar statements of the extent of this privilege have
appeared in subsequent cases.9 1 These cases have made clear
that the existence vel non of probable cause is an issue to be
determined on the facts of each case.

Further light was cast upon the content of the probable
cause standard in the recent case of Oakes v. Alexander.9 2 The
court of appeal was faced with a problematical factual situation
involving application of the privilege to pleadings in a civil suit.
Defendants - who had been plaintiffs in the federal civil action
wherein the questioned allegations were made - had charged
plaintiffs with certain unethical and criminal acts. The instant
court stated that it was "unnecessary to delve into any extensive
details bearing upon the asserted libelous contents of these
pleadings, for it is apparent, even upon a casual perusal . . .
that the accusations . . . constituted charges of numerous
breaches of ethical conduct, as well as the commission of criminal offenses of conspiracy to defraud and actual theft, all of
which, if untrue, are libelous, per se. ' ' 93 The court went on to
88. 116 La. 293, 40 So. 708 (1905).
89. There has been some indication that a broader privilege may obtain with
respect to witnesses. See The Work of the Louiisana Supreme Court for the
1951-1952 Term - Torts, 13 LA. L. Rgv. 278, 280 (1953).
90. 116 La. 293, 302, 40 So. 708, 711 (1905): "[A]n allegation is not privileged unless founded on probable cause."
91. See, e.g., Dunn v. Southern Insurance Co., 116 La. 431, 40 So. 786 (1906)
Sabine Tram Co. v. Jurgens, 143 La. 1092, 79 So. 872 (1918) ; Waldo v. Morrison, 220 La. 1006, 58 So. 2d 210 (1952).
92. 135 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961). See companion case of Meadors
v. Alexander, 135 So. 2d 518 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
93. Id. at 514.
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point out that in defendants' brief in this action, it was stated
that no justification for the questionable allegations had been
found by counsel in the record of the instant proceeding or in
the record of the federal action. Construing this statement as
an admission taking the issue of probable cause out of the case,
the court experienced no difficulty in predicating liability on
Lescale and other cases holding that the privilege in question is
not absolute.
It is noteworthy that defendants had acquired new counsel
since the earlier federal court action in which the allegedly defamatory pleadings were filed. Counsel in the instant case
argued strongly that defendants should not be held responsible
for the unwise statements of prior counsel. The above-mentioned fatal statement in defendants' brief was made in the effort to buttress this argument.
The court, referring to the fact that defendants had signed
the pleading affidavit, found no merit in the attempt to transfer
the onus from defendants' shoulders to those of prior counsel.
In light of the position taken by the court on this argument, it
is perhaps unfortunate that the brief's admission that no justification for the pleadings could be found was taken so literally.
If the statement by the court that the allegations were libelous
on their face was based upon study of the record, and may
further be taken to mean that the statements were both untrue
and made without probable cause, well and good. However, if
the court based this statement on the admission by defendants'
second set of counsel that no justification could be found, this
is another matter. It seems doubtful that counsel meant to admit that the questioned allegations were made without probable
cause. The term "justification" has not traditionally been subStituted for the "probable cause" terminology of the jurisprudence. It seems more likely that counsel's statement was used
with reference to the presence in the record of factual basis for
the allegations. If this were the case, then inquiry by the court
into the requirements of the probable cause standard would not
have been precluded.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY

Any unauthorized offensive or harmful touching amounts to
a battery. This definition includes any such touching, although
incident to medical treatment. However, because of the exigen-
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cies of medical practice, the determination whether treatment is
"authorized" -i.e., whether there has been consent to the treatment- often takes on a different color than in the ordinary
battery case. Thus a doctor is privileged to proceed without consent in the face of an extreme emergency, on the theory that the
unconscious patient is to be presumed to have consented to the
effort to save him from death or serious harm. Likewise, often
a patient will be held to have impliedly consented to treatment
by reason of the special relationship existing between him and
the doctor under circumstances which would not constitute an
implied consent absent such relationship. Despite these differences in application, however, the rules remain the same for unauthorized medical treatment as for any other allegedly harmful or offensive touching. If the patient is not found to have
consented to the treatment as a whole, or if the doctor is found
to have gone beyond the bounds of consent given in the course
of his treatment of the patient, a battery will have been committed.
The proper application of these legal principles was in question in Carrollv. Chapman." Plaintiff had presented herself to
defendant, a chiropodist, complaining of a callus formation on
the ball of her right foot. In 1958 defendant treated her for the
first time, removing the callus without penetrating the outer
skin. On February 8, 1960, plaintiff returned to defendant, the
callus having recurred in a worsened condition. This time defendant undertook to remedy the situation by removing a portion of a metatarsal. This remedy called for surgery, which was
performed. The operation was not a success, leaving plaintiff
with a deformed foot, and she brought suit, claiming that she
was unaware that the bone was to be removed until defendant
was well into the operative procedure. The trial court gave her
a judgment based on her lack of consent to the treatment in
question. The court of appeal reversed. After a thorough review of the record, the court found that there was no showing of
express consent. However, adverting to a presumption of consent "to a minor operation where the probability of ill consequences is rather remote,"95 the court found that plaintiff had
impliedly consented to the operation.
The reviewer is left with the distinct impression that plaintiff herein had not the slightest idea that a piece of bone was
94. 139 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
95. Id. 'at.66.
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about to be taken from her foot, and might well have balked had
she been warned that such was to be the treatment. It appears
that defendant did not indicate to the patient that the treatment
would be any way different from that earlier received and that
preparations for the treatment would not have indicated such
difference. The court's finding of implied consent seems to be
based primarily upon the presumption that by submitting to
treatment plaintiff had consented to "minor" operations. It is
noteworthy that the court cited no authority for the existence of
such a presumption, and it is submitted that to originate one
would be undesirable. Protection of the medical profession
against frivolous battery suits is of course desirable. On the
other hand, the law is equally concerned with protecting parties
from unconsented-to invasions of personality at the hands of
anyone, and in the instant case it seems that just such an invasion had taken place. In striking a workable balance between
these aims, courts are assisted by the flexibility of the usual
approach to the question of the existence of consent to medical
treatment. A presumption of consent to minor operations
"where the probability of ill consequences is rather remote"'9 6
would, if literally applied, rob this approach of much of its
flexibility.

MARITAL REGIMES'
Robert A. Pascal*
SUITS To ENFORCE COMMUNITY RIGHTS

Ordinarily only the husband may sue to enforce a community
right. The general rule was applied in Warren v. Yellow Cab
Co.,2 a suit to recover for losses borne by the community of
96. Ibid.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Decisions on this subject matter applying well understood principles and
rules, and which therefore need not be discussed, are: Sylvester v. Sylvester, 137
So. 2d 716 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1952) on marital property following a reconciliation; Simon v. Simon, 138 So. 2d 260 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) ; Succession of
Cazendeck, 138 So. 2d 613 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; and Monk v., Costin, 134
So. 2d 598 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961), on the presumption things acquired during
marriage are community property; Johnson v. Shreveport Transit Co., 137 So. 2d
463, (La. App., 2d Cir. 1962) and Gallie v. Ingraham, 140 So. 2d 741 .(La. App.
4th Cir. 1962) on torts of the wife; and Egstrom's of Alexandria, Inc..v. Vaughn,
138 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) on eligibility for homestead rights..:.:
2. 136 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).

